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Double-stack container train service was successfully introduced in 1984 and has
expanded rapidly since. The newly designed five-platform articulated well railroad car
serves as the vehicle. Space-age computer-assisted design has helped to engineer a
radical departure fi-om conventional railcar configuration and produce significant
weight and rolling resistance reductions. Commensurate with introduction of this new
generation of equipment, the ocean carriers and railroads have developed new
cooperative train scheduling procedures and container railcar handling methods.
Additionally, the higher volume of containers per stack train has forced a redesign of
railyards and marine terminals. Opportunities for unique military application of stack
train technology and possible container rate reductions await the military transporter.
The expedient maturation of stack train technology has provided an early opportunity
for a thorough review of its development, the impact upon the containerized freight
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
A sweeping change has manifested itself in the manner in which ocean carriers
and railroads are conducting business, best embodied through examination of the new
railroad double-stack unit train container service first successfully introduced by
American President Lines in April 1984.
Innovations in intermodal cooperation, service contracts, new rolling stock, and
container handling methods create the demonstrated potential for container rate
reductions, more prompt and reUable service, less shipper involvment, and improved
shipment traceability through door-to-door service and shorter scheduled train transit
times.
Sufficient progress has been reached over the past two years to enable a
thorough examination of the state-of-the-art operations of double-stack trains by the
railroads, ocean terminal operators, and ocean carriers. Consequently, its present and
future impact on the military shipper can be assessed. Further, military service
apphcations will be explored in view of the unique double-stack equipment technology.
B. OBJECTIVES
The main objective of this thesis is to rigorously acquaint the military transporter
to the new double-stack train industry, and to the new service procedures, container
handling processes, and business arrangements that have accompanied its introduction.
In so doing, a comprehensive description of the innovations in railroad operations,
terminal operations, coordination between railroad and steamship lines for both service
and contractual arrangements, and equipment design will be presented. Imphcations
for the military shipper regarding feasibility of unique service apphcation for stack
equipment and container rate reductions will be reviewed. Peripheral issues such as
railroad track wear will also be addressed.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Imphcit to the aforementioned issues, the following primary research question
has been postulated:
What is double-stack, unit train container service, how has it developed, and what
unique service applications and potential for container rate reductions appear feasible?
Secondary questions pertinent to the subject include:
1) How is double-stack container train service difierent from conventional
container-on-llatcar (COFC) service and what efliciencies does it provide
operators and shippers?
2) What service applications ^and container rate reductions are foreseen utilizing
the unique advantages of double-stack, unit train container equipment and
service?
3) What service handling and equipment changes have taken place and are
planned at railroad vards and ocean terminals to best take advantage of
double-stack containei" unit trains?
4) What eOect has double-stack container train service had upon competing
transportation modes and what coordination cooperation has evolved betweeii
them?
D. SCOPE
This case study will examine the development of double-stack unit train container
service to date; its impact upon the manner in which railroads, ocean carriers, and
ocean terminals conduct business; and its current and projected impact upon the
shipper. Also. militar\' applications of the new types of equipment fielded by the
railroads will be researched.
The scope will include double-stack train effect upon rates, service, cargo
traceability and loss and damage, container handling procedures, and market niche
(limited to non-proprietar\' and unclassified data).
Existing rail costing models may be applied as necessary'. No attempt will be
made to develop any new empirical container rate structure, but it will seek to identify
any obvious changes in container rates wrought by the economies of double-stack
trains.
E. ASSUMPTIONS
It is anticipated that the character of this study will remain general enough to
provide thought provoking reading for a broad audience. However, limitations prevent
expanding the background to encompass a review of the entire intermodal freight
transportation industp.'. Naturally, the greatest benefit will be to the military
transporter with some foundation in container cargo movements.
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F. METHODOLOGY
Accumulation of data for the double-stack container train industry will include a
comprehensive review of published literature with complementary telephone and
personal interviews of representatives in the ocean carrier, ocean terminal, and railroad
companies.
The impact of double-stack technology upon military cargo container rates will
be assessed through analysis of the MSC Container Agreement and Rate Guide and
through interviews with MSC contracting personnel and ocean carrier government
sales representatives.
Equipment manufactures will be solicited for engineering data concerning
equipment capacities and service specifications. Future technological innovations will
be reviewed as well as possible adaptation of equipment for unique militan,'
applications. The Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA) of the Militar\' Traffic
Management Command (MTMC) has provided their plan for research efforts involving
double-stack railcars.
Published information will be limited to non-proprietary and unclassified data.
G. ORGANIZATION
This thesis incorporates nine chapters. Chapter II provides general background
regarding legislative developments, market forces, and the intermodal industry'.
Chapter III will discuss the embr\'onic development of the double-stack concept by the
ocean carriers and railroads. Chapter IV will describe the introduction of the double-
stack service and the current double-stack network. Chapter V will thoroughly
describe available stack equipment, the dilTerences between competing brands, and
their advertised cost-saving features and potential for further improvement. Chapter
VI will describe and interpret a representative exempt rail transportation agreement.
Chapter VII explores militarv* service considerations. Chapter VIII investigates
terminal efficiency as it relates to double-stack service. Chapter IX presents a
summar>', conclusions, and recommendations.
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II. INTERiMODAL INDUSTRY BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
A burst of technological innovations has swept the intermodal freight industry in
the past five years, one result of which has been the successful introduction of
articulated container-on-container railroad train cars. Figure 2.1 pro\ides a
representative comparison between conventional trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC),
conventional container-on-llatcar (COFC), and the new double-stack COFC.
4i"niAJLin
CONVE^f^ONAL TOFC








Figure 2.1 Intermodal Configurations.
This equipment, operated in unit trains of 20 cars hauling 200 containers per
irainload, is being initiated with increasing frequency by railroads in high-volume
corridors for both scheduled and nonscheduled service, and also both in fixed contract
movements for ocean carriers or direct retail hauls for commercial shippers. Transit
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times are tightly managed and unit train movements are [lexibly coordinated directly to
vessel sailings with steamship line representatives and thereby avoiding interchange
delay. Dramatic fuel savings of 20 to 40 percent have been reported with significant
overall operating cost reductions resulting from union labor concessions and equipment
eniciencies. The dramatic expansion of double-stack container service since April. 19S4
has had a noted impact upon all aspects of intermodal container service to U.S.
shippers, both import export and more recently in domestic container freight traffic
development.
The implications for the shipper and the industry from just this one evolution are
so great as to engender investigation of new opportunities for the military
shipper logistician into discounts for existing service, new and faster service, and
unique service applications resulting from double-stack, train equipment features.
Because double-stack train service is a recent development (American President
Lines first introduced successful coast-to-coast double-stack service with the Union
Pacific Railroad in April 1984). comprehensive Uterature is just at this time reaching
print. Because a large segment of miUtary transportation personnel have had little
opportunity to familiarize themselves with double-stack container trains this justifies a
primer covering the background, existing service, and potential for unique military
applications of the container-on-container articulated well train industry. A major
postulation will be supported by this review that interprets the host of technological
and procedural innovations surrounding double-stack train service as having been
brought about through analysis of the traditional transportation system from new
angles and enactment of enlightened legislation. In other words, the precept being
promoted here incorporates the belief that, through enabling legislation, the
spontaneous introduction of double-stack container service has acted as a catalyst in
innovative thought and helped open the door for other complementary and novel
container handling procedures and business concepts (cycle loading,' unloading of
containers at railyards, improved telecommunications between ocean carriers and
railroads, shifted emphasis upon coordination of larger container unit trains toward
vessel sailing schedules, etc.).
Ready acknowledgement is paid to the fact that the double-stack container boom
has mushroomed so in the past two years as to make any comprehensive review dated
literally within weeks. This treatise can best serve the reader as background, definition,
and fertile material for creative thought. As such, this chapter is intended to provide
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both an explanation of legislative origin and industrial equipment evolution to steer the
reader into a better understanding of the intermodal container segments of both the
railroads and ocean carriers.
The intermodal container industry has developed as an entity all its own. crossing
all transportation modes in a vertical integration elTect. A feeling for this maturing
segment of the international transportation industn,' strongly complements an
understanding of recent stack train activity.
A note at this point about terminology is in order. Twin-stack, double-stack. Lo-
Pac 2000. Fuel-Foiler. two-tier. Twin-Pak. and container-on-container are just some of
the industr\' nomenclature or brand names gaining popularity for describing the
stacking of one container atop another onto a redesigned, articulated, well flatcar or
skeletonized railcar. Of these, it seems double-stack has been adopted most readily by
the press as industry' terminolgy. The sensitivity of many equipment manufacturers
and intermodal service companies towards association of their product or service to
one or more of these terms is acknowledged. However, without discriminator}" or
promotional intent, the term double-stack, as popularized by the media, will hereinafter
generically describe the act of placing one container atop another onboard a railcar.
B. EARLY INTERMODAL EFFORTS
In order to properly understand the developments surrounding the evolution of
the double-stack concept in the 1980s, a comprehensive background review is necessar\'
to focus upon those events leading up to the introduction of the stack train. The
discusion in this section draws heavily from John H. Mahoneys publication,
Intermodal Freight Transportation, as prepared in 1985 for the ENO Foundation For
Transportation, Inc. in Westport, Connecticut. [Ref. 1]
The double-stack train concept is an extension of the intermodal, container
revolution that gained popularity in the 1950s. Interestingly, the first recorded carriage
of freight by intermodal truck trailers on railroad Ilatcars was in 1926 on the Chicago
North Shore and Milwaukee Railroad. Piggyback services, as both container or truck-
on-flatcar services were then called, grew slowly but steadily until the middle 1950s,
when the pace quickened. The development of long-haul rail-truck intermodality was
hampered between the 1920s and the mid-1950s by the growing rail-truck competition
for long-haul trailic and by inflexible government regulations. The present expanding
intermodal operations are attributed to the relaxation of regulaton," restraints beginning
in the mid-1950s.
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In addition to the parochial attitudes of the railroads and the aggressive over-the-
road truck competition, the Interstate Commerce Comniission (ICC) in 1931 issued a
decision to a container service case which placed an additional roadblock before faster
rail-motor intermodal development. The decision required that rail rates for intermodal
containers be related to the class rate structure in that it required no container move at
less than the carload rate or more than one class lower than the any-quantity basis
applicable to the commodities in question. The carload rate on the highest-rated
commodity would have to be applied to the whole containerload if it was higher than
third class. Plus, varying rates with minimum weights m the 4000 to 10000 pound
range were prohibited. This elTectively put a lloor under piggyback rates and made
rate calculation much more compUcated. The final act limiting intermodal
development was a 1935 Association of American Railroads (AAR) resolution against
through routes and joint rail-truck rates except where such arrangements would not
constitute invasion of another railroad's territory.
A major precursor to stack train technology was the introduction of piggyback
trailer-on-fiatcar (TOFC) and container-on-flatcar (COFC) service. Development of
TOFC service remained tentative as the New Haven Railroad petitioned the ICC in
1953 for a declaratory' judgement on the legal status of piggyback services in many of
its ramifications. In the spirit of The Transportation Act of 1940 which recommended
".
. . developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system . . .",
the ICC issued findings in 1954 that generally favored piggyback development as an
intermodal instrument. It found that through rates and joint rates between railroads
and motor common carriers were permissible and further delineated the roles of
railroads, private carriers, contract carriers, freight forwarders, shippers, and others in
relation to piggyback carriage.
Five major piggyback plans evemually developed from these ICC actions. In
1955, the Pennsylvania Railroad inaugurated a Plan I type service (railroads line-haul
motor carrier's trailer with no shipper railroad contact) for trucklines. Plan II service
(railroad service at rates competitive with motor carrier rates) was also authorized.
Plans III and IV service (less complete services involving flat rates per trailer regardless
of contents), useful mostly to freight forwarders, were not cleared until 1962 by
afTirming decision of the Supreme Court. In 1964. the ICC issued Ex Parte 230. a new
set of rules clearly deUneating the five plans, declaring I and V to be "joint intermodal"
and II. III. and IV as " open tarilT". permitting the latter's use by all types of carriers
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and shippers. The railroads' challenge to the "open tariif aspect was denied by the
Supreme Court in 1967 and. thereupon, piggyback service plans were solidified and
became one of the developmental cornerstones leading to the eventual introduction of
stack trains.
In the business arena, a major milestone occured in 1956 as the Trailer Train
Company began railroad car leasing operations. A major catalyst in the ready
availability of llatcar rolling stock for TOFC COFC operations. Trailer Train presently
operates approximately 120,000 cars for use by most railroads and aggressively pursues
development of new rolling stock technology, such as articulated and stand-alone well
tlatcars.
Another cornerstone to stack train development occured on April 26, 1956. when
a converted tanker carrying 58 trailer vans on its specially adapted decks, sailed from
Newark, New Jersey to flouston. Texas, thereby touching off the container revolution.
Actually, this event demonstrated three principles necessary to support an industry that
incorporates large-volume unit movements of containers by rail. These included
movement of cargo in standardized containers, oceanborne movement of containers,
and eOlcient land-sea interchange of containerized cargo. Malcom Mclean, a trucking
executive, used the operating rights of the Pan Atlantic Steamship Corporation as his
medium to support, in 1956. the initial sea-land experiment. The service was successful
from the beginning. At the outset he used converted tankers, the Ideal X and the
Alema. each with a capacity of 58 20-foot containers. 1 he fleet was soon expanded by
two more converted tankers. In 1957. the company took deliver\- of the first ten
containerships. each with a capacity of 226 35-foot containers and equipped with ship
mounted cranes. The company name subsequently changed to Sea- Land Services.
Today Sea-Land Services is the worlds largest containership line.
Moving from the demonstration phase to institutionalization was another matter
indeed. The U.S. Navy's Militan.' Sea Transport Service (MSTS) began experimenting
with 6x6x6-foot steel containers for militar\" shipments on commercial vessels shortly
after World War II and quickly developed as a result of the Korean War. these
military containers were referred to as container express boxes, or more popularly as
CONEX boxes. By 1967 there were over 100.000 CONEX containers in use worldwide,
and the success of this system led to later development of intermodal ocean containers.
During the 1950s almost ever>- major steamship line invested in containers similar
to CONEX containers. Flowever. containerized shipments constituted only a ver}'
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small fraction of the load on any one sailing. Containers ranged in size from
approximately 250 cubic-foot to approximately 500 cubic-foot capacity. Leasing firms.
such as CONTR.A.XS. invested in these square shaped containers and steamship lines
employed them mostly on a pier-to-pier basis, not intermodally.
The CON'EX box reached its peak popularity in 1965 and then, except for
mihtap.' use. faded rapidly, being replaced by the standard 8x8x20-foot dn.' cargo
intermodal container. It is used as a basic measuring stick in many statistical
comparisons and is referred to as a TEU, a twenty-foot-equivalent-unit. An
8x8x40-foot container is equal to two TEUs.
The land-sea intermodality aspect progressed slowly, mainly as a result of
competitive animosity between land and sea modes combined with institutional
lethargy. Intermodality was confined primarily to local pickup and delivery' of
containers by trucks. Even though trailers were hauled by TOFC in the early 1960s,
the individual shipments were rehandled at truck terminals, railroad pier stations, or
steamship piers. Few unitized shipments went overseas intact until transatlantic
container service mushroomed in the later 1960s.
One major obstacle to containerization was the heavy initial investment in
containers, vessel conversion, and terminal facilities. Full cost savings could only be
achieved through uncompromised fully converted containership operation. The subsidy
system did not encourage U.S. ocean carriers to make capital investments for profit
enhancement. The United States shipbuilding subsidy program was based on potential
ton-miles produced per dollar spent, rather than on operating elficiency or profitability
of ships produced. As a result the program continued to crank out obsolete breakbulk
vessels long after the container revolution had proven its point. Labor unions fought
containerization because of the negative impact upon the total number of future union
jobs.
Conference carriers, were especially insulated from any new ideas. The
framework within which they operated was a share-of-the-market allocation system
among themselves. Having operated on a subsidized basis within this allocation system
for many years, they had dispensed with research and planning departments as
unneeded. and therefore did not have an internal alarm system that might have alerted
them to the need for change. Successful containership operators currently engage in
"load-centering", or limiting the number of ports of call, funneling the freight through
just a few major ports, and serving other ports by local land or sea connecting carriers.
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In the 1960s, though, load-centering would have altered the conference's established
share-of-niarket allocations, thereby pitting conference members against each other in
an unwelcome competitive struggle.
Additionally, the conference rate-making system was based on commodity rating,
which allowed the conferences to set prices on the basis of "what the traffic will bear".
Containership pricing, by contrast, is based on a flat per container or per ton rate,
regardless of the conunodities packed inside of the containers. Because conference
carriers felt their margin of profit came from the high-rated conunodities. it was
difficult for them to accept the possibility that lost revenue from this source would be
ofTset by the efllciencies of containership operation.
However, in early 1966. Sea-Land Service inaugurated the first transatlantic
containership service, and by 1973 virtually all transatlantic trade was carried by
containerships and ro-ro (roll on-roU off) vessels, albeit dominated increasingly by
foreign carriers.
One noted change to the ocean carrier's financial makeup is that the container
revolution made an already capital-intensive business even more capital-intensive by
reducing dockside labor costs and increasing capital equipment costs. Double-stack
train equipment and expected innovative crew reductions continue that trend for the
railroads.
C. DEREGULATION
One of the principle benefits resulting from the deregulatory legislation enacted in
the 1970s and 19SOs was the liberalized permission for carriers of one mode to own and
operate carriers of another mode. In a decision under the new legislation, the ICC,
eflective Januan.' 6, 1983, eliminated regulatory restrictions enacted in 1935 to protect
the then infant trucking industn.' from the railroads. This new flexibility was greeted
warmly by the rail and ocean carriers but with some dismay by the trucklines because
rail carriers have greater inherent financial clout to buy out many of the smaller motor
carriers.
Another important deregulatory boost to intermodality was to free rail piggyback
carriage from all ICC regulations. This was accomplished, not alone by legislation, but
through an exemption promulgated in an ICC rulemaking procedure under the
umbrella of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980. The ICC proceeding was entitled Ex Parte
No. 230 (Sub. 5), the results of which became efTective March 23, 1981. Ex Parte No.
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230 (Sub. 5) was actually instituted on August 21, 1978. prior to passage of the
legislation, but it was not pursued vigorously by the Commission until late in 1980.
after both the Motor Act and Staggers Rail Act became law. This action has aiTordcd
the railroads greater flexibility to price piggyback competitively against truck, hauls, as
well as wider latitude for routing tratTic on joint rail-piggyback hauls involving rail-
owned trucklines. A more recent rulemaking proceeding. Ex Parte No. 230 (Sub. 6).
decided 20 September. 1984. extends piggyback deregulation to exemption of truck
rates from regulation in joint piggyback operations with the railroads.
Piggyback has grown considerably since its inception in the 1950s as noted. In
1977 piggyback traffic represented seven percent of all rail revenues, second only to the
carriage of coal. From 1969 to 1977 rail piggyback tonnage grew by 40 percent, while
rail tonnage generally dropped by six percent. In spite of the increase in piggyback
tonnage, it had not reached forecasted volumes, amounting to less than one percent of
all intercity freight movements by all modes at the end of its initial period of growth.
Less-than-anticipated volumes were attributed in part to the federal regulatory
structure preventing flexibility and inhibiting creative marketing. Further, a lack of
aggressiveness on the part of the railroads to promote piggyback was blamed again on
regulatory inhibitions, a reluctance to cooperate with truckers, and a perception that
piggyback was only marginally profitable. Also, the shippers felt that the service was
complicated by lack of coordination among modes and noncompetitive in terms of
flexibility and transit times.
However, in 1977 the deregulatory process began and carrier reluctance about
cooperation with other modes, and lack of enthusiasm for new intermodal piggyback
services, changed significantly for the better.
Simultaneously, the interstate highway system began to fall into a state of
disrepair in the late 1970s, after years of neglect, thereby furnishing rail piggyback
services with a boost in competitive image. Highway fuel and truck tax increases
further contributed, but were ofTset somewhat by subsequent liberalization of weight
and size limitations for highway trucks and trailers.
In 1983, piggyback volume accounted for 12.4 percent of all rail carloadings,
ranking second to coal (27 percent). That same year. 2.3 million flatcars carried almost
four million trailers or containers by rail. In May 1984. Trailer Train reported that its
piggyback operations had grown 18 to 19 percent over the previous year. Final figures
for all rail carriers in 1984 showed that trailers and containers loaded rose 11.7 percent,
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to 4.569.094. while the number of cars loaded with trailers and containers rose 14.6
percent to 2.690,659.
D. BRIDGE SERVICES
This dramatic increase in piggyback service as brought about by deregulation
contributed strongly to the development of stack trains in so far as the growing
pressure by rail carriers to serve a burgeoning conventional COFC market led them to
explore new ways to more elTiciently accommodate the higher container volumes
through a finite number of increasingly busy rail corridors. The answer was to increase
the container unit train carn-ing capacity through stack train technology and keep the
number of trains operated from skyrocketing. Another vital market force receiving
widespread credit as a priman.- motivation in fostering double-stack unit train service is
the expansion of "bridge" services that cross the U.S. continent. Landbridge,
minibridge. and microbridge are terms used to describe rates for the land portion of
certain intermodal movements of freight across the United States or Canada, or to and
from points within these countries.
1. Landbridge Service
First conceived in the 1960s as a more elTicient means of shipping between the
Far East and Europe, the U.S. Canadian landbridge uses transatlantic and transpacific
water transport combined with rail piggyback to move goods across the North
.Anierican continent. Two distinguishing characteristics of this landbridge are: (1) the
entire movement between the Far East and Europe is covered by a single bill of lading
issued by a steamship company or an NVOCC (non- vessel operating common carrier).
and (2) the goods remain in the same container for the entire movement, in spite of
the publicity given landbridge, volumes moved have not been significant. The
U.S. Canadian landbridge was intended to compete against the all-water route via
India at a time when the Suez Canal was closed and the Siberian landbridge was not
yet in full operation.
2. Minibridge Service
U.S. minibridge was created shortly after landbridge. It applies to shipments
moving between foreign and U.S. (and Canadian) points. The rate is calculated as if
through all-water transportation were used to or from a port near the U.S. (Canadian)
citv of origin or destination.
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The shipment actually moves via the designated U.S. (Canadian) port, but by
surface transport. For example, a minibridge shipment from Japan to Wilkes Barre,
Pennsylvania could use the all-water rate from Japan to the port of Philadelphia, then
a rail or truck rate from Philadelphia to Wilkes Barre. even though the cargo actually
arrived by sea at Los Angeles and moved by rail to Wilkes Barre via Philadelphia.
As in the case of landbridge. minibridge shipments are covered by a single bill
of lading, and the goods remain in the same container for the entire movement.
Minibridge tariffs are published by the steamship lines, and the proportional divisions
of the revenues are negotiated by steamship lines with other intermodal carriers.
There are minibridge systems linking the Far East with U.S. points via West
Coast and East Coast ports (as in the Japan- Wilkes Barre example), and linking the
Far East with U.S. points via West Coast and Gulf ports. An example of the latter is
a shipment from Montgomer\'. Alabama moving by rail to New Orleans, then to the
port of Los Angeles, and by ocean carrier to the port of Pusan, Korea. There are also
systems linking Europe with U.S. points via East Coast and West Coast ports (for
example, Hamburg, Germany via New York and San Francisco to Sacramento), and
also systems linking Europe with U.S. points via East Coast and Gulf ports (Dallas to
Copenhagen via Houston and Baltimore).
3. Microbridge Service
Microbridge service and rates were devised in 1970 to apply directly between
interior U.S. (and Canadian) cities and foreign cities via a single port, avoiding double-
port transits of minibridge systems. Modifying the minibridge Japan to Wilkes Barre
example, the microbridge movement would be from Japan to a West Coast port such
as Oakland and then direct via rail piggyback to Wilkes Barre, avoiding the port of
Philadelphia. The movement would be charged a through rate, possibly discounted
below the combination of rates via the port utilized. A microbridge shipment also is
covered by a single bill of lading issued by a steamship company or an NVOCC. the
cargo remains in the same container for the entire movement, and tariffs are published
by the steamship lines, which negotiate proportional divisions of the revenues with
their intermodal partners. Neither shippers nor consignees have control in deterniining
routings or port gateways to be used in microbridge movements.
4. All-Water Versus Bridge Route Competition
Minibridge and microbridge rates and services, especially microbridge. have
had a considerable overall market impact. Deregulation by the ICC and EMC
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(Federal Maritime Commission) has given aggressive carriers greater freedom to use
these systems to undercut existing rate structures, to direct cargo from ocean rate
conferences, to negotiate rates with shippers, and to implement through rates without
notice or explanation of the proportional division of revenues between participating
intermodal carriers. In elTect. it has caused a significant change from the environment
of the 1916 Shipping Act that permitted ocean carriers to join together to fix and
enforce rates and conditions of service.
One of the most significant deregulator\" moves by the ICC was to eliminate
piggyback rate regulations, permitting ocean carriers to establish through intermodal
rates using piggyback at almost any rate level that they wished. The ICC move was
soon followed by FMC action permitting publication by ocean carriers of intermodal
through rates without separating the portion representing the ocean carriage.
As the bridge traflic became more susceptable to flexible pricing schemes
ocean carriers became more interested in cutting operating costs and maximizing profit
while at the same competing aggressively with the all-water routes. Concomittent to
the significant savings in overall transit times {for example. U.S. Lines' Yokohama-
Chicago bridge transit times by containership via the all-water route to a Savannah
port call), the bridge rate need only be comparably priced as a result of the double-
stack economies in fuel and labor savings. It is significant to note at this point that
initial probings by APL (American President Lines) in 1982 towards railroad
development of double-stack technology resulted in only rebufls [Ref 2: pp. 30-31]. It
is interesting to observe that an ocean carrier had the vision to see value in reducing
the overland movement costs for competitively shifting cargo market share from all-
ocean to ocean-rail movement. One would logically have expected the railroads to
advance technology themselves that would capture cargo market share from a
competing transportation mode, a sensitive topic with railroad management.
Intermodalism became a popular "in" word in the United States in 19S5.
However, the idea was strongly promoted in the early 1970's when McKinsey was
advocating main port to main port marine transport, and the more farsighted operators
in Europe saw the advantage of using integrated transport sytems and developed them
slowly taking full advantage of existing railroad and inland waterway routes.
Development of intermodalism remained stunted for a decade because [Ref 3: p. 13]:
1) Relatively few containers moved to the hinterland.
2) Ship operators had to jnaintain their position in the conference system by
calling at a full range of ports.
-»")
3) Ports fought to maintain status by insisting on direct calls.
4) Road transport was relativelv expensive in view of the long distances to be
covered.
5) Above all. reeulatorv agencies controlled the terms under which the railroads
could accept cargo.
The opportunities resulting from reaching new inter-corporate agreements and
restructuring multi-modal corporations came into reach in the 1980's commensurate
with enacted deregulations necessan.' to facilitate these business arrangements. The
speed and efficiency that has become synonymous with double-stack unit train
operations have allowed this new technology to become a major link necessar\' for
intermodalism to blossom.
In relation to the bridge services previously described, stack trains have been
reported to reduce transit times betweeen the Far East and the U. S. Midwest by three
days and New York by four days when compared with conventional COFC flatcar
service. Overall, there is a savings of nine days compared with the all water route
between the Far East and New York [Ref 3: p. 14]. Rail officials additionally claim a
reduction of between one and three days on transit times between Europe and the
Middle East to the U. S. west coast compared with the all water route [Ref 3: p. 14].
Quantified savings have been more controversial and less publicized. Some shipping
lines have expressed overall savings of between 15 and 20 percent compared with
conventional COFC flatcars but no comparisons between the all water and rail routes
have yet been published. [Ref 3: p. 14]
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III. MARKET FORCES AFFECTING THE STACK TRAIN
A. INTRODUCTION
Existing reviews that describe the double-stack container train phenomenon all
cite one or another of a host of economic and market driven forces as the progenitors
of the twin-stack innovation. In fact, its appearance is tightly interwoven with the
development of new cargo movement control and handling methods that are
encompassed within intermodalism and incorporate the "just in time" philosophy of
inventory level management.
The events described in the previous chapter provided the latitude for exploration
of new cost saving technology and different methods that would lead to service
improvement. But what need would drive a carrier to such development efforts, and
what mode would initiate development of the stack train concept? A look at the
economic market conditions of the past decade is in order.
B. DEPRESSED RATES
An excess of "bottoms" (as cargo-carrying ocean vessels are typically referred to
in industry slang) has become a virtual tact of Ufe for the steamship lines in the latter
70's and 80's. as overconstruction and a worldwide general economic recession brought
the rapid expansion of international container movements to a halt. Instantaneously,
two other trends of major importance surfaced. Imports to the L'nited States from
Pacific Rim countries rose sharply, and the L'. S. industrial base was evidencing a shift
from heavy" industries of the "rust belt" to service industries of the "sun belt"
specializing in soft high value, vulnerable, and non-transportable offerings (services
requiring only international electronic communications and no movement of cargo).
Further, European consumers were expressing a new interest in Japanese manufactured
goods, posing a challenge to the European businessman. This trend has caused an
increase in containerized cargo moving form the Far East to European markets, either
via our all-ocean round-the-world carrier or utilizing the U. S. Canadian landbridge.
C. LOAD CENTERS
The glut in container service, by keeping container rates depressed, has denied
steamship lines any profit-taking opportunity that could have resulted from the
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escalating value-of-goods shipped in containers. That has caused a greater emphasis
on cost control and saw the early demise in the 70's of Sea-Land's SL-7 super-
containerships that had high speed capabilities and fuel-gobbling habits. This has
further forced the construction of "low-cost-per-container-slot" 4400-plus TEU
containcrships that operate economically through low fuel consumption diesel
propulsion at a disadvantage to the former containcrships' speed. This speed
reduction, complete with their gigantic size, has brought on the new intermodal
concept of load-centering in which all ports are identified by steamship Hnes as load
centers or feeder ports. Their superships, in round-the-world transit, call only at load
centers, and containers are then shuttled to and from the other feeder ports for the
final inland delivery. In this way, the superships call only at ports capable of efiiciently
handling the unloading and onward movement/distribution of such large quantities of
containers all at once. They also minimize the total time that the container is involved
in its slowest portion of the journey, the over-the-ocean leg. The ability to quickly and
economically move large quantities of goods around the world has aided the emergence
of a "global" economy. Concentrating production or heaxw industry in the southern
regions of the world has allowed the focus to shift from an industrial to an information
society in the northern regions. This places a new burden upon efficient interval
movement of containers in bridge, minibridge. microbridge and even domestic
movements in the United States, being a conveniently located "island" between the fast
developing Far East and the Euro- Mediterranean land mass. Political exigencies
continue to prevent the Siberian landbridge from opening up to its full potential,
although an increase in traffic has been experienced.
The imminent fruition of load centers, conceptually not a new idea, the inevitable
focus on total transportation system cost control, and the soaring emphasis on the
time factor brought on by high-value goods has in the last few years generated strong
competition between U.S., Canadian bridge traffic and the all-water Panama Canal
route. The advent of unit stack trains in landbridge traffiic in April 1984 by American
President Lines has provided a further divergence in coast-to-coast transit times (three
days quicker over conventional COFC service) between landbridge and the all-water
route. This has allowed the already depressed bridge rates to remain, but at an
improved profit to the ocean carrier. The ocean carriers are reaping the majority of
profit by engineering fixed contracts with the railroads to haul containers via stack
trains based on a flat container charge and not value-of-shipment variable rates. The
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ocean carriers are interfacing directly with the shipper and not. with some domestic
cargo and backhaul traffic exceptions, the railroads. Further, the coast-to-coast transit
time improvements stem from an insistence by the ocean carriers for railroad stack
train service, instead of conventional COFC. They have linked with the railroads a
new philosophy of managing the departure, movement, and arrival of stack trains in a
much more closely coordinated fashion. Ocean carriers are routinely in a constant
interface with railroads via ocean carrier representatives stationed in railroad yards and
via computer hookup. This allows the railroads to schedule and control through
movements of double-stack unit trains directly to vessel arrivals and departures.
D. RAILROADS RESIST STACK DEVELOPMENT
In essence, the need for economical stack train service was funneled through
steamship lines as a direct result of the increased need to compete eOectively with all-
water service (United States Lines, Evergreen, etc.) to and from the Far East.
Although the economics are obvious, the volume trend was predictable, and the
technology was at hand. APL executives who approached various segments of the
railroad industry seeking a partner in the development of the double-stack were turned
down. It was labeled a "boutique train", too speciaUzed to be widely accepted for rail
use. APL. therefore, developed the stack train concept to fruition. [Ref 4; p. 46]
Analysis of internal railroad statistics by car-type reveal that other pressures may
have caused a resistance to double-stack implementation as well. Two major points
bear mentioning. Both rail intermodal and truck traffic have grown in the past three
years at the expense of the boxcar. The economics of the double-stack container are
such that on long-haul movements neither TOFC nor truck are going to be able to
slow the diversion of traffic from their mode. The use o[ boxcars from plants and
distribution centers to wholesalers and shipper-direct is down dramatically. One
shipper reported car useage in total was down from 35,000 to 40.000 cars a year in
1978-79 to 18,000 cars a year in 1984 with nearly all cars now used in 1984 in inter-
plant service. A second shipper reported that customer direct shipments by boxcars
were down from 95 percent boxcar to a point where, within 90 days of the interview,
there would be no boxcar loads to the customers. However, there would be 7000 to
7500 intermodal customer moves in 1984. The "trailer freight" pool of the domestic
surface transportation industn.' is most vulnerable to diversion to containers operating
on stack trains. Most shippers do not diilerentiate between intermodal and truck in
defining "trailer freight"; it is simply total freight moved. As stack train service
(combined with hub to ultimate consignee delivery by truck) proves the equal of TOFC
or over-the-road truck, its cost benefits will lure more and more shippers to it.
Assuming a "ramp-to-ramp" intermodal charge to the shipper of approximately S.70 to
S.SO a mile, it is clear that on a stack train where power, fuel, and labor are held
virtually constant at the conventional COFC level, a container ramp-to-ramp rate of
approximately S.40 to S.50 may be possible. Figure 3.1 compares estimated linehaul
costs for various intermodal configurations and graphically illustrates the overall
economic advantage that double-stack technology encompasses. By pricing the
backhaul container space at the margin, S.-^O a mile, ramp-to-ramp domestic container
freight has become a reality, as American President Company's (APC, the new parent
of all .AP companies) subsidiary American President Domestic Transportation
Company (APD) has already experienced in their eiforts to concentrate solely on
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The "Achilles heel" for railroads in diversion of trafilc from conventional
COFC TOFC and boxcar to stack trains is the tremendous potential for
underutilization of relatively new. undepreciated rolling stock and the added cost of
investing in wholly new unique ec[uipment in order to compete or even just maintam
their share of the freight market vis-a-vis other railroad and truck competition. For as
the port managers are quickly finding out. deregulation and the increased cargo
mobility that stack trains oiler are changing their traditional port territories established
by conference agreement and. likewise, may allow signilicant enough shifts in cargo
volume between ports serviced by competing railroads to alter a rail carrier's base load
from that point. In order to avoid this investment gamble in equipment, railroads have
resorted to including in their service contracts with the ocean carrier a clause directly
passing along the car hire and mileage charges for the new equipment and locking the
ocean carrier into penalty payments for tonnage shortfalls or early contract
termination. This has essentially passed the stack train equipment rental risks onto the
ocean carrier [Ref 6: pp. 3-4]. In short, by putting many of the world economic,
steamship line, and domestic railroad trends together, it has been shown that the
development of double-stack trains came about concurrently with. and. in turn, proved
a catalyst for further development of the new global intermodal transportation system.
Each facet of the double-stack industry and related events surrounding the stack
train involvement with the new intermodal expansion will be reviewed next in further
detail.
IV. DOUBLE-STACKS: PIONEER EFFORTS TO DEVELOPED
NETWORK
A. DOUBLE-STACKS: THE FIRST EFFORTS
1. Southern Pacific
The first scheduled double-stack trains were inaugurated by Southern Pacific
Railroad in 1981 with service between California and Texas. A total of 42 bulkhead
retainer type cars were constructed by ACF Industries, Inc. The concept, however,
didn't have an immediate impact upon the COFC, TOFC market. [Ref 7: p. 10]
2. American President Lines
The next entrant was American President Lines, which had pioneered the use
of container unit trains using conventional flatcars in 1979 with its Linertrain service.
APL. an Oakland-based trans-pacific ocean carrier, began testing a double-stack
prototype of its own in the summer of 1983 with a combined movement of 19 Southern
Pacific double-stack cars from Los Angeles to Kansas City and to Chicago via the
Burlington Northern Railroad. All of the cars, part of APL's Linertrain service from
Los Angeles, were filled with Asian import containers carried by APL vessels. On the
backhaul to Los Angeles, most of APL's containers were filled with domestic
westbound freight to California for customers of Merchant-Stor Dor Freight System
Inc. of Chicago and Western Carloading Co. Inc. of Los Angeles, both subsidiaries of
Transway International Corp. of New York with which APL has an agreement for
domestic freight backhaul forwarding. [Ref 2: p. 30]
As a precursor to its success with double-stacks, Transway and APL had
concluded a series of landmark agreements with each other and with the railroads in
1981 to resolve their own transportation How imbalances and secure certain service
guarantees. Transway has a preponderance of westbound domestic freight, and APL,
with 20 cargo vessels in the Pacific, accounts for heavy flows of import cargo from
Asia which must move cross-countr\' from West Coast ports. This allowed a
refinement of their cargo balancing programs and has contributed to APL's success
with its double-stack service by ensuring backhaul utilization. [Ref 2: p. 31]
In April 1984, APL began replacing its conventional Linertrains of single-
stacked containers on railroad-owned conventional flatcars with articulated, five-unit
well cars, owned and managed by APL. The initial investment was for S12 million. By
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n-Lid-l^^S5 further investment shot their total to over S20 million. A concurrent
reorganization that placed APL subordinate to a new parent. American President
Company, added American President Intermodal (API), and American President
Domestic Transportation Company (a combination o[ three former Brae Corp.
subsidiaries; National Piggyback Services. Inc.. National Piggyback Specialized
Commodities, and IntermodaL Brokerage Services. Inc.). API owns and controls the
new equipment and APD is designed to provide westbound shipments in domestic
containers from the East and Midwest. Westbound Linertrains had been 85 percent
loaded and risen above 90 percent since. Eastbound. the trains have been
approximately 98 percent loaded. [Ref 8: p. 62]
APL's stack cars were introduced by the Budd Co. and redesigned and built by
the Thrall Car Co. at Chicago Heights, 111. One of APL's five-platform stack cars can
be seen undergoing loading in Figure 4.1. Initially, the cars held 40-foot containers in
the wells and 20-foot to 45-foot boxes on top of them, held together by interbox
connectors (IBC's). The IBCs are clamp devices just like the ones used to securely
hold containers to each other by their flanges on the weather decks of ocean vessels
and were chosen to reduce the overall weight oi'^ the stack car. Recent development
elTorts have resulted in well cars accommodating 45-foot boxes in the well and 48-foot
domestic containers on top of either 40 or 45-foot boxes. [Ref S: p. 62]
The light, lloorless cars have American Steel Foundries 70-ton trucks at each
end. and three American Steel Foundries (ASF) 100-ton trucks in between supporting
the joinings of units with ASF articulated connectors. A 100-ton ASF truck is shown
in Figure 4.2. The boxes snuggle into well flanges and the car undersides have six
inches of clearance above the rail, including allowance for three and one quarter inches
for wear and spring deflection. There are 20 easily insertable and removable steel
connectors or IBCs per car that are strong enough to hold stacked containers six high
onboard ocean vessels. [Ref 8: p. 62]
Donald C. Orris, currently president of API and formerly vice president-inland
transportsation services for APL. is credited with fathering the successful introduction
of double-stacks. Before moving to APL in 1977, Orris was manager of intermodal
services for the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, where he first proposed that
onQ box could ride on top of another. Lacking the cooperation of connecting
railroads, the idea was then shelved. Since, the current development of stack trains
involved mechanical officers of Union Pacific System, Chicago & North Western, and
Conrail after APL had taken the initiative. [Ref 8: pp. 62-63]
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Fi2ure 4.1 An APL Double-Stack Railcar.
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Figure 4.2 A 100-Ton ASF Truck.
Initial service experience with the equipment tied into mile long trains (each
Thrall car set is 269 feet long) that weigh over 5000 tons loaded was outstanding.
Minor improvements such as stronger brackets to guide boxes into wells, two full-
length stringers in the open well-bottoms to protect against floor failure, reinforcing
plates on intermediate unit side guides, and relocated car-end walkways for yard
personnel to work further from the open wells, have enhanced the resiliency of the cars.
End-of-car cushioning with 15-inch-travel gear was found to be unnecessary and a
switch was made to Cardwell VVestinghouse H60 hydraulic draft gear with three and
one quarter inches of travel. Early problems with the truck mounted brakes were
quickly resolved and the Davis Brake Beam Truc-Pac' has been performing well.
[Ref S: p. 63]
Managing the logistics for the equipment required unexpected effort. .A.PL
underestimated the complexity of the operation, which involves coordinating ship
unloading with train loading on the West Coast, load shuflling at Chicago, and
unloading on the East Coast, in addition to scheduling of trainsets and flnding
backhaul loads [Ref S: p. 63]. APL stafl' at Los Angeles. Seattle. Chicago, and New
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York maintain daily contact through three conference calls that involve location,
quantity, and balancing of containers, chassis, and rolling stock. In addition, computer
programs help managers develop train consists to prevent clearance and well car
overload problems. [Ref 9]
By providing priority scheduling and priority loading and unloading of
container trains in the railyards, the railroads have achieved an average 53 hour transit
time from Chicago to Los Angeles and back. C&NW, whose yard at Wood Street has
been central to feeding of containers between the Los Angeles-Chicago round trips and
the Chicago-Kearny. New Jersey round trips, was required to make major
acconunodations to its all-piggyback yard and reserve one of its five Piggy Packer
loading devices exclusively for APL's double-stack trains. Initially its track sections
were so short that it could only handle 20 standard Trailer Train flatcars. And
C&NWs port of entry into Chicago is the Proviso Yard, which required a secondary-
route of three hours running time to transit to Wood Street. In July 19S5, C&NW
relocated its piggyback operations a short distance to the Canal Street Yard (formerly
owned by the Missouri Pacific), making Wood Street an exclusive double-stack faciUty.
In addition, the adjacent, unused Robey Street Yard was acquired from the Baltimore
& Ohio Chicago Terminal Railroad, thus giving C&XW a total of 110 acres for
development of its entirely new faciUty, christened Global I, scheduled for completion
in November 1986. Global I was designed in close cooperation with the steamship
lines in the realization that the facility will be handling the ocean carriers' trains,
business, and containers. [Ref 10: p. 33]
B, DOUBLE-STACK TRAIN NETWORK
As of 1 May 1986, more than 30 double-stack movements a week including 12
railroads and 11 steamship lines were in service as illustrated in Figure 4.3. A year
earlier, in 1985. fewer than half those movements involving only four railroads and two
vessel operators were in operation. [Ref 11: p. 36]
Double-stack frequencies var>' from six to one per week. Cars run in solid trains
or as blocks in solid intermodal trains that generally consist of 20 five-well articulated
stack cars that hold approximately 200 FEUs, 10 to a car set. Unit trains, however,
have been assembled to 28 cars in length. With each train towing a capacity almost
one-half greater than conventional COFC unit trains, speculation abounds concerning
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Figure 4.3 Double-Stack Train Main Traffic Flows.
enough freight in developing fronthaul movements to allow some industrv' optimists to
speculate that continued growth will cause an increase oi'4() more weekly double-stack
movements (from 30 currently to 70 per week) by the summer q{ 19S7. [Ref. II: p. 36]
Making up these new trains are 161 five-unit articulated cars from Thrall and 204
cars from Gunderson, all owned by Trailer Train; 313 cars from Thrall with 60 more on
order owned by American President Lines; S3 Gunderson cars with up to SO more on
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order owned by Sea- Land; and 43 early bulkhead units built by ACF (no longer
manufacturing double-stacks) and owned by Southern Pacific. These figures are from
mid-April 1986 and have been climbing steadily since. American President and Sea-
Land both lease to supplement their fleet. The double-stack unit tram main traffic
flows are depicted in figure . Currently, Sea- Land deploys 163 double-stack cars a
week. Many of them run in solid trains making a "huge figure eight" with Los Angeles
and Tacoma on one side, Chicago in the middle, and Little Ferry, New Jersey, on the
other side, with both Tacoma and Little Ferry being Sea- Land operated terminals. For
Sea-Land moves from Tacoma. Burlington Northern (BN) is the carrier, while Santa Fe
handles them from Los Angeles. At Avard, Oklahoma, Santa Fe delivers a block to
BN for movement to the Southeast through Memphis. In Chicago, Santa Fe and BN
turn over their Sea- Land traffic to Chessie, which delivers it to the Delaware & Hudson
(D&H) at Buffalo. D&H moves it on to Binghampton, New York, where the New
York, Susquehanna & Western Railroad takes over for the run to Little Fern.'. Sea-
Land also uses SP for a Los Angeles-New Orleans movement. American President
reUes on UP, C&NW, and Conrail (CR) for double-stack movements from the West
Coast to South Kearny, N.J. To Jersey City, Conrail handles Vlaersk and K Line
double-stacks originating on the West Coast and moving to Chicago over UP and
C&NW. Conrail, as of April 1986, had spent S10.8 million to raise clearances on its
water-level route alone. [Ref 11: pp. 38-39]
Conrail also handles a double-stack Mitsui move to Columbus. Ohio. This
traffic originates at Los Angeles as a solid train handled by SP. At St. Louis, the
Illinois Central Gulf Railroad takes a block for delivery to Chicago, and CR takes the
rest to Columbus. The double-stack Mitsui traffic reaches Columbus mixed with
single-stack cars in all intermodal trains in furtherance of Conrail's policy of combining
stack traffic with other intermodal business or several steamship line's business into
one stack train whenever the volume of one ocean carrier is insufficient to warrant a
full double-stack train. On the eastern fringe of Conrail's ex-Pennsy Chicago-New
York route, clearances prohibit stacks, thereby requiring a breakdown of
Seattle/Tacoma originated double-stack containers. At Chicago, these loads are drayed
between BN and Conrail and U.S. Lines stack traffic from Oakland also is broken
down. [Ref 11: p. 39]
As more and more high-value retail merchandise freight finds its way into
domestic containers, the double-stack network is bound to expand further. The current
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fad craze that stack trains are enjoying is luring many new customers to experiment,
such as North Carolina furniture makers, appliance manufacturers, and so forth. This
may lead to a permanent growth or a later retrenchment if service standards fail to
meet expectations of first time rail customers. Also, high density, or weight-limited
goods should soon be accommodated upon completion of testing and production of a
successful stand-alone car that, with heavier tonnage douhle-axle trucks, can reach
container weight load limits. With this equipment eventually in place, the outer
envelope of containerizable cargo can be reached with double-stack train service. It
will then only be a question of how rigorously the other nodes of the intermodal





Articulated well railcars capable of transporting one container on top of another
represent a technological breakthrough in design. Without the limitations that
conventional railcar construction impose upon designers seeking strength and
durability that the traditional heavy. soUd railroad cars provide, computer assisted
designers at the Budd Co. and Gunderson Inc. have developed two competing space-
aged "drop-frame" flatcars that incorporate tremendous weight and rolling resistance
gains over conventional COFC equipment. A third manufacturer, ACF Industries,
Inc., actually provided the first examples of double-stack equipment to Southern
Pacific in 1981. However, the failure of the Southern Pacific design to substantially
reduce tare weight prevented significant economic advantages from materializing and
limited its impact upon the COFC market. [Ref 4: p. 46]
The two successful manufacturers of stack train rolling stock essentially have
split the market evenly. The Budd Co. designed car is marketed as the LOPAC 2000
by the Thrall Car Manufacturing Company of Chicago Heights, Illinois (full address:
P.O.Box 218, Chicago Heights, Illinois 60411; phone 312,757-5900) and has undergone
several design improvements since inception of service with APL in April 1984. The
more recent competition, Gunderson Inc. of Portland Oregon, entered the business on
1 March 1985 and has experienced an immediate flurry of orders (4350 N.W. Front
Avenue, Portland, Oregon, 97210; phone 503/228-9281). [Ref 11: p. 38]
The intent is to fully and accurately describe both manufacturer's equipment
offerings, including the advantages and disadvantages touted by each builder.
However, no inference is made concluding that one design is to be promoted as better
than the other in this thesis. Descriptions of one car's benefits over the other have
been, for the most part, provided by the vendors, and that should be kept in mind as
this chapter is reviewed.
There are a number of similarities in the railcars ofTered by these manufacturers.
Both designs involve a five-platform configuration to make up one railcar. These
platforms are joined by semipermanent connectors that tremendously reduce the slack
typically found between railroad cars. The platform sets incorporate eight fewer axles
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per set. 12 total versus 20 for five conventional flatcars [Ref. 12: p. 2-3]. Both platform
types use "drop-frame" construction with open wells reinforced with stringers for
weight savings. The 12 axle positions are clearly illustrated in the drawing of a
complete Gunderson railcar set in Figure 5.1. The open well designs of both car types
can be compared in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3.
One key diObrence between Thrall cars and those of Gunderson is the means by
which the upper container is secured. Similar to the first stack train designs built by
ACF. Gunderson cars feature bulkheads at the end of each articulated unit, thereby
eliminating the need for interbox connectors used in the Thrall units. Both bulkheads
and interbox connectors retain the top containers in place satisfactorily. The bulkhead
cars are slightly heavier than the IBC cars but allow the containers to be positioned
onto the car by a crane operator without the assistance of ground personnel that are
necessary for the IBC equipped car in order to remove IBC clamps to securely anchor
the top box at loading. Illustrations of the two car types clearly show the dilTerence in
design. [Ref 11: p. 38]
Both manufacturers have made slight improvements in their designs and. notably
in Thralls literature, slight variations in dimension and tow weight are noted in their
descriptions of the 40-foot well platform, 45-foot well platform, and for both
manufacturers comparing end platforms with center platforms [Ref 13: p. Ij.
Generally, Gunderson's Twin-Stack car is 265 feet 1 1 2 inches in length and 9 feet 1
1
12 inches wide. The height from the rail to the bottom of the platform (empty) is 8
1 2 inches. The height of two empty 9-foot 6-inch super-cube containers is 19-feet 11
1 2 inches from the rail and loaded 19 feet 9 3 4 inches. To insure clearance for 20
foot right-of-ways, a standard height 8-foot 6-inch or 9-foot high container must be
mixed in for safe transit. The Twin-Stack railcar is shown completing a loading
operation in Figure 5.4. [Ref 12: p. 4]
The Thrall car, in comparison is 291 feet 1 12 inches in length and has an inside
width of well of 8-feet 1/2 inch. Its height from the rail to the bottom of car sill is 9
1 4 inches. Its total height from the rail with two super-cube containers is then 19 feet
9 1 4 inches empty, very similar in repects to the Gunderson car. The nominal
capacity per platform is 101.500 pounds. The estimated tow weight per platform is
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Figure 5.1 Gunderson Five-Platform Railcar Set.
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Figure 5.2 View ofGunderson Railcar's Open Well.
40
Figure 5.3 View of Thrall Railcar's Open Well.
B. DYNAMIC FORCES
1. Longitudinal
There are three basic types of movement that are seen in rail transportation;
longitudinal, lateral, and vertical. APL offers a brief explanation of the benefits oi'
their car (and. one would think, similarly equipped cars) in reducing the movement and
forces in each ol' these directions as compared to movement on conventional
intermodal cars. An understanding of these dynamic forces allows a better insight for
the prospective customer when examining the new stack train rolling stock. [Ref 15]
Longitudinal movement is created in switching rail cars for train make up and
may occur at intermediate locations from the rail origin and destination when
conventional cars are added. This also occurs due to the run-in and run-out of trains
while they are in transit. This run-in and run-out is created due to standard intermodal
rail cars having 15-inch end-of-car cushioning at the ends of each car consequeuntly.
when the train is going downhill, it will contract so that nearly all of this extension is
gone. This force is also seen when the train engineer is braking the train with the
locomotive onlv rather than usine the brakes on the rail cars. This is normallv called
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Fieure 5.4 The Gunderson Twin-Stack Railcar.
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dynamic braking and causes the train to contract when braking. If the engineer is not
careful this contraction can be rapid and can create fairly significant logitudinal forces.
The normal size standard intermodal train is approximately 50 cars. In
theory, at this size of train it is possible to see 125 feet of slack action when the end of
car cushioning goes from the fully extended to the fully contracted position.
APL's (and Gundersons) rail cars used in the stack train service are five-
platform articulated rail cars. The articulated connection, which takes place at the
intermediate ends of each platform is a fixed semi-permanent attachment. There is no
slack to speak of at these locations. At the end of each car is 15-inch end-of-car
cushioning (since changed to Cordwell Westinghouse H60 hydraulic draft gear with
only 3 i 4 inches of travel.) The stack trains are normally operated with 20 of these
five-platform articulated cars. In comparison to the standard intermodal train, these
double-stack trains only have a theoretical slack distance of 50 feet. This significantly
reduced slack distance also retards the longitudinal forces seen while trains are in
transit.
2. APL Innovation
Recognizing that longitudinal forces created by run-in and run-out in train
service can be a primary cause of lading damage during rail transportation, APL went
one step further. The end of car cushioning is created by hydraulic fluid being
transferred from one chamber to the next through 12 ports (or holes). Lock-out valves
have been installed in 10 of these 12 ports which significantly reduces the flow of the
hydraulic Ouid between the chambers at low forces as experienced during in-train
service created by the run-in and run-out of slack action. These valves make the end
of car cushioning much stiller at the lower forces and allows the run-in and run-out to
be much slower and controlled as opposed to being relatively free and sloppy which
can create quite a jarring elTect at the ends of the travel of the end of car cushioning.
The valves, on the other hand, will open up at higher impact forces which might be
seen in train make up or while switching and allows the end of car cushioning to work
as intended. To the best of their knowledge, the APL stack cars are only the second
application of these valves in rail cars, due in large part to the expense of having them
installed. Their use is widely recognized as an effort to reduce longitudinal forces
created bv slack action.
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3. Rolling Movement
There is a rolling movement, known as lateral movement which is common in
rail transportation and is created by the variation in height from one side of the track
compared to the other side. In any rail service there is naturally a certain amount of
roll that takes place. APL's stack train rail car. because of its articulated connectors at
the intermediate ends of the platforms, significantly reduces this rolling movement as
one platform rolls one direction and next one is rolling the opposite direction and the
result is that the platforms counteract each other and tend to dampen the rolling eflect.
This is a condition that is well known for any articulated rail car design and does not
apply specifically to APL's cars.
Results of tests performed at the Transportation Test Center in Pueblo.
Colorado over the rock and roll section of trackage were very impressive. The car was
loaded in a worst case configuration which had every other platform loaded to a very
high combined center of gravity with the alternate platform loaded to a low center of
gravity.
In this manner it was thought that the heavier and higher center of gravity
platforms would not be affected as much by the lower center of gravity and lighter
loaded platforms and, as a result, a higher degree of roll would result. Even under this
severe condition the rolling movement was minimal.
4. Vertical Movement
Insofar as vertical movement of rail cars is concerned, no data are available
for conventional flatcars to allow comparison with articulated stack cars. It is
believed, however, by APL that a stack car would create a superior ride because the
truck centers are 50 feet 6 inches and standard intermodal rail car truck centers are
approximately SO feet. This plus the reduced camber in the car body on APL cars
should minimize the vertical accelerations or bouncing.
C. MANUFACTURER PROFILE
Gunderson, Inc. has had some media exposure and serves as a convenient
example from which to sketch an industry profile. A member of the Greenbriar
Leasing Corporation, which includes the subsidiaries Greenbrier Intermodal,
Greenbrier Capital, and Gunderson, Inc., produced 1450 container carrying platforms
in 1985 since its startup March 1 and purchase of FMC Corp's Marine and Rail
Equipment Division in Portland, Oregon. An advantage is the fact that Gunderson's
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fellow subsidiary, Greenbriar Intermodal. is dedicated to developing the market for the
Twin-Stack container rail car. having had total sales for the period exceeding S45
million. Located along the Willamette River in Portland. Gunderson's 75 acre facility
has 750.000 square feet of manufacturing space and a capacity of 6.000 cars per year.
Greenbriar Leasing was Gunderson's first Twin-Stack customer for 100 platforms.
These were, in turn, provided under short term lease to Burlington Northern and Sea-
Land. Greenbriar also uses their cars as marketing tools to aquaint prospective
customers with Twin-Stack performance. At its peak backlog last summer. Gunderson
was constructing Twin-Stack cars at the rate of 12 platforms per day to meet early
delivery schedules required by customers anxious to implement or expand their double-
stack transportation programs. [Ref 16: pp. 30,32]
D. COMPARISON BETWEEN CONTAINER RESTRAINING SYSTEMS
1. Similarities
As previously mentioned, the primary difference between the Thrall car and
the Gunderson car is the use of IBC's and bulkheads, respectively, for holding the top
containers in place. Since both cars are reasonably close in dimension (with some
length and aerodynamic considerations addressed later), load bearing capacity, and
adaptability to all container sizes (20. 40, 45. 48-foot), the two different container
restraining systems bear further attention.
2. Groundsmen
An Arthur D. Little. Inc. study dated March 7. 1986 and commissioned by
Greenbriar ofTers an examination of the difierences between car types [Ref 17: pp. 1-S].
The source of their study consisted of observations made at ten terminal locations, two
operating only IBC cars, seven operating only bulkhead cars, and one operating both.
Loading and unloading operations were observed. Groundsmen were employed at 80
per cent of observed double-stack terminal operations that included all IBC car
operations and five of eight bulkhead car operations. These goundsmen are essential
for operating the IBC car because the top containers on these cars must be secured by
four inter-box connecting devices, and groundmen are required to manually install,
lock, unlock, and remove the IBCs at the corners of the bottom box. The groundsmen
are not required for bulkhead car operation. At the five bulkhead car operations.
Arthur D. Little. Inc. reports that they were there due to work rules or because they
were working on other conventional equipment. The number of groundsmen used with
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the one IBC car ranges from one to three per crew. Potential cost savings due to the
extra crewniens' wages and reduced liabiUty were noted. The actual figures noted by
Arthur D. Little are omitted here because, without more complete cost data for other
areas of operation and exact equipment purchase prices, listing partial data to promote
a particular vendor's equipment would be unfair.
3. Theft Protection
The study further notes that the issue of protection from container theft was
repeatedly raised in their interviews. When containers are placed on a bulkhead
equipped car, the container doors become very dilTicult to break open because of the
presence of bulkheads and Oippers (needed as spacers to accomodate difierent
container lengths with one car size). With the IBC equipped car. it was noted, the
platform used by groundmen in loading and unloading is also convenient for thiefs and
vandals in removing lading. There are no bulkheads to protect the container doors
from being opened. Their report notes that the assistant terminal manager of a
Chicago terminal cites weekly break-ins. while terminals using bulkhead cars reported
little or no theft, largely attributed to the bulkheads.
4. Cycle Loading
A new type of container loading and unloading technique has been linked to
car type as well. Cycle loading is claimed to significantly enhance the value of double-
stack cars. After initial unloading to create space, each platform level (both upper and
lower) is unloaded and then the same platform is reloaded again, as equipment is
moved rapidly down a block-loaded train. The conventional loading unloading method
requires that the entire train is first stripped prior to any reloading. Loader crews
travel twice the distance as they have to traverse the entire length of the train to
reload, a considerable distance when contemplating mile-long stack trains. In cycle
loading, chassis are never empty, and only slightly more than half the number of
chassis and drays required for conventional loading are used. This is a critical
consideration in maintaining tight chassis pool management and aids in the balancing
of available chassis. Cycle loading can be used with both IBC and bulkhead cars,
resulting in lower costs for the steamship lines. However, Arthur D. Little. Inc. found
that terminal operators are not cycle loading with the IBC car. ostensibly because cycle
loading was found not to be as cost elTective using IBC railcars. This conclusion was
unsubstantiated in the report and. therefore, may be discounted as the conclusive
reason for not cycle loading IBC equipped railcars. In conclusion, it was found from
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the study that the bulkhead car eHminates ground personnel costs, reduces exposure to
liability, minimizes the liklihood of pilferage, and is more cost eflectively utilized
through cycle loading.
E. LINE-HAUL OPERATING EFFICIENCIES
1. Fuel Consumption
The next area for review concerns double-stack equipment line-haul operating
efTiciency. Several recent studies warrant mention. The first, by John H. Williams and
Judith II. Roberts of the Woodside Consulting Group, generated comparative data
between hypothetical intermodal runs from Los Angeles to Chicago for double-stack
equipment, conventional COFC, TOFC, and trailer and container-on-lightweight car
utilizing a computerized rail cost model to determine each of the variable operating
costs. Fuel consumption was shown to be 32 percent of over-the-road truck fuel
consumption, 16 percent better than conventional COFC and 12 percent better than
lightweight COFC {lightweight COFC/TOFC represent the new skeletonized ultralight
single container or trailer on llatcar technology). Double-stack rail service was also
found to be competitive in total trip time. 53 hours (includes loading unloading) versus
50.3 hours for over-the-road truck. Without unnecessary detail, primar\' cost
components for double-stacks were found to be 59 percent of total conventional COFC
costs. The study concluded that, as service speed had become competitive with over-
the-road truck, COFC double-stack service can elTectively divert a greater share of the
truck freight market. Although actual costs in cents per mile were not shown in this
study they will be addressed at a later chapter. [Ref. 18: pp. 242-248]
2. Streamlining, Weight Reduction, and Articulation
Also of interest is the elTect streamlining, weight reduction, and articulation
have upon train sets of intermodal cars and how much double-stack cars have
advanced in fuel savings as a result of each factor. A study Fuel Use Simulations of
High Productivity Container Trains by Daniel S. Smith of Manalytics. Inc., has taken
an engineered rail cost model (RCM) to estimate round trip fuel consumption for
existing double-stack container trains and hypothetical integral intermodal trains
between Los Angeles and Chicago [Ref 19: pp. 236-241]. The observations and
conclusions reached concerning double-stack train design and the efTiciency value of
each type of improvement are of greatest concern. The base case selected for the
analysis was a double-stack, cabooseless container train similar to those in use by
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American President Lines and Sea-Land Service, i.e., the Thrall and Gunderson cars
respectively. The base case train consisted of 20 cars, each composed of five
articulated platforms or wells carrying stacked 45-root marine containers. Platform
tare was set at 2S.000 pounds, container tare at 8.550 pounds each, and lading at the
average highway load restriction load limit of 43.000 pounds each. The total loaded
car. therefore, came to 131.000 pounds with two stacked 45-foot containers. The
net tare ratio, by the way. is an impressive 86,000 45,100 or 1.91. as compared to a
conventional piggyback net/tare ratio of just .67. Model runs were made by changing
one factor and holding the others constant. One pass was used to guage the influence
of articulating the entire train (as if the whole train were one car) saving one truck per
car or a total of 20 trucks per train. One run was conducted just to show the effects of
streamlining by using an equation coelHcient simulating trailing cars in a passenger
train. This was compared to a base case coefficient that represents boxcar wind
resistance as no coefficient has been scientifically developed for stack trains and.
logically, loaded stack train cars most closely simulate boxcars. The impact on tare
weight was analyzed by comparing the 28,000 pound current double-stack conventional
average with a 23,000 and 18,000 pound theoretically improved car model. Other runs
were made with integration of motive power (power units on platforms instead of
separate conventional locomotives) and multiple combinations of the aforementioned
changes.
The results were as expected. Car weight had the greatest impact (3.6 percent
fuel saved), followed by streamlining (I.l percent), and lastly, full articulation,
contributing only .7 percent fuel savings. The actual percentages are valuable in that
they can be compared to each other to see how much each contributed relative to fuel
savings. The actual numbers are meaningless in this thesis, however, for determining
fuel savings of double-stacks vis-a-vis conventional COFC since the computer runs
were designed to determine how much further an integral train would benefit fuel
savings beyond a base case stack train. The eflect of integration or articulation which
reduced the number of axles was ver\' small. The savings accrued through streamlining
were equally modest. The effect of streamlining varies with the square of velocity. The
base case and streamlined trains were modelled averaging 48 to 49 MPM when moving.
Speed limits varied between 50 and 70 MPH, depending on terrain, but the train did
not always reach the limit when running upgrade. Also, some railroads have restricted
double-stack trains to 60 .MPH due to their high gross weight per operating brake. If
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the average speed were raised to 60 MPH. according to Mr. Smith, air resistance would
increase by 53 percent and streamlining would be more important.
One conclusion that this study has made clear is that double-stack container
trains are dominated by their loads. The containers and lading account for 85 percent
of the weight and 92 percent of the air resistance in the lightest-car model (IS,0(.)0
pound tare). The requirements for motive power are determined by the train's load,
not its tare. In fact, the double-stack, car design is already so spartan that its sole
function is to keep the containers over the railroad wheels and connected together in a
train. It offers no protection from the elements, and no support or containment for
the lading itself. Aside from some additional minor weight savings, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the double-stack equipment currently being oOered represents a new
constant in efficiency that will set a benchmark for the industry.
3. Streamlining Improvements
Although the paring of tare weight from stack car designs has nearly reached
its practical limit, further efforts are still underway to squeeze more fuel efficiency from
streamlining. Airflow Sciences Corporation of Livonia, Vlichigan has performed wind
tunnel tests with scale models of Gunderson's Twin-Stack articulated well cars that
have measured air resistance to their standard units as well as to modified units with
the addition of thick and thin spacer blocks attached to the tops of the bulkheads to
reduce the between car voids and associated wind turbulance. [Ref 20: pp. 1-4]
Wind tunnel work at Lockheed-Georgia in 1983 found that, for well cars
carrying containers, the size of the gap between loads on adjacent cars was the major
variable. Streamlining of the containers themselves was shown to be o[ minor
significance. At 60 MPH, a sharp break in resistance occured between gaps of 75 and
45 inches, with the reduced gap lowering air resistance by as much as 50 percent. The
wheelbase of a standard 100-ton truck is 70 inches. Therefore, containers in articulated
well-type cars cannot be closer than about 100 inches, especially if both upper and
lower containers are the same length. Reduction or virtual elimination of this gap with
filler IS the aim of the thick block thin sheet experiments at Airflow Sciences Corp.
The testing was accomplished assuming an average yaw angle of five degrees
to simulate typical cross-wind conditions. Base on a study by Dr. Frank Buckley of
the University of Maryland, it was concluded that five degrees is a representative
average yaw angle for vehicles travelling at 55 MPH in the continental United States.
The tests were performed upon scale models at 120 MPH winds which translated to
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true scale speeds of 19.2 MPH. Three car arrangements were used to allow the fore
and aft cars to produce a first-order representation of the remaining train's interference
elTect. Data were also compared to a 1983 Thrall car test at Lockheed using 30
percent scale models. Conversion calculations were performed to align their data to
parallel the 16 percent Airflow Sciences Corp. tests.
The drag area between end-of-car units was found to be more than double the
drag area between intermediate articulated units (45.8 square feet versus 21.5 square
feet). The diflerence was due to the increased gap distance between 40-foot container
faces. Between intermediate units, a gap distance of 10 feet exists between 40-foot
container faces whereas, between end units, a gap distance as large as 25 foot e.\ists.
The estimated drag area for a five-platform Thrall car (as converted from the
1983 test) is 166.7 square feet. 26 percent greater than the Twin-Stack car without
aerodynamic modification (131.8 square feet) and 77 percent greater than the Twin-
Stack's best aerodynamic modification for 45-foot containers (93.9 square feet).
Drawbar force calculations utilizing car weights of 31,000 pounds for the
Thrall car. 35.000 pounds for the Twin-Stack without aero, and 36,000 pounds for the
Twin-Stack with aero modification reveal almost equal drawbar pull at 40 MPH
between the Thrall and Twin-Stack cars (1620 pounds versus 1507 pounds) but a
quickly growing advantage for the Gunderson car at 60 MPII due to the apparent
advantages of reduced air turbulance between container platforms (Twin Stack 2181
pounds versus Thrall car 2472 pounds).
Using an equation to determine gallons of fuel consumed per 100,000 miles
that takes into account the drag area variations and a function for fuel use in hill
climbing, braking, and acceleration, Airfiow Sciences Corp. determined that at 60 MPH
a Twin-Stack car would require 53,520 gallons per 100,000 miles whereas a Thrall car
would use 59.160 gallons, or an increase of 5.640 gallons per car. The 45-foot
aerodynamic modifications would enhance fuel savings by an amazing 6.870 additional
gallons, or 46.650 gallons total. Considering the earlier work by Manalytics in
highlighting the emphasis car weight appeared to have over the efiects of streamlining,
the difference in car weight of 4.000 pounds (31.000 pounds for the Thrall car versus
35.000 pounds for the Twin-Stack) apparently did not infiuence the Airfiow Sciences
Corp.'s calculations as much as expected. However incredulous one may be of the
results the wind tunnel rests also ascertain the value of streamlining at higher speeds
and the potential for improvement that the Gunderson car has in that area.
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F. STAND ALONE RAILCAR DESIGNS
Over the near horizan, car manufacturers and marketing leasing firms are keenly
examining the development of "stand-alone" well cars designed to couple platform to
platform without articulation. The primary motivation for this last area of opportunity
is to enable carriers to haul two weighed-out containers at the same time. Present well
car load limits either require cutting oiY loading containers to their hmits of about
67.U00 pounds or mixing one light' and one heaw' container per platform (as most
current loading procedures call for) to prevent overstressing. As aggressive marketing
of double-stack service seeks to attract the weight-limited commodity groups such as
canned goods, wine, dry prepared foods, and so forth, carriers will want to be ready to
ofTer this service safely. As top loads of domestic 48-foot boxes become more popular,
weight limitations will more readily present themselves. Trailer Train has developed
designs for three dilTerent stand-alone double-stack cars capable of handling two
48-foot containers. [Ref 21: p. 22J
Thrall Car Manufacturing Company has delivered the first prototype to undergo
static, dynamic, and field testing at Hammond. Indiana, and at the Transportation Test
Center at Pueblo. Colorado. It is expected for the wells to permit load limits above
135.000 pounds. The lightweight trucks of the first prototype are a frame structure
guiding two single axles under each end of the car. By letting the axles support the car
at the sides instead of through a center pin. stability should be improved. The axles
are 32 inches apart and carry 28 inch wheels. Swing hangars and leaf springs are used
as suspension, and a damper spring or hydraulic device will be used to control 'truck
hunting' (the phenomenon in which the slack between the wheel flanges and track
width allow the truck to twist as it is guided down the track). The first prototype uses
15-inch end-of-car cushioning and comes in at a tare weight of 50.000 pounds (possibly
cut to 45.000 pounds with some design modifications). The first and second prototype
car use IBCs. with a third to use bulkheads. [Ref 21: p. 22]
G. ACCELERATED TRACKWEAR
One very important issue of industry-wide concern to the railroads is the
potential for accelerated track wear or even damage posed by the introduction and
widespread use of heavy load-bearing stand-alone stack cars. Time was when the
movement of 79,000-pound-per-axle equipment was confined to isolated unit coal
operations which could be safely ignored with respect to potential for widespread
51
uncontrolled use. Bui with 40-root double-stacked containers, each loaded to its 67.000
pound maximum cargo, the load on one truck (including tare) would be over 168,000
pounds (articulated unit), equivalent to a load of 330.000 pounds on a four-axle car
and well over the 125-ton capacity hea%w coal cars presently in limited route use.
Further. 20-foot containers could be loaded to 52.S00 pounds. If four were seated on
an intermediate platform of a five-unit articulated car the total load would be
241.200-pounds on one truck, the same as over 480,000-pounds on four axles and far
beyond any railroad's experience. If load-capable stack cars are fitted with 125-ton
trucks, that possibility could be achieved. [Ref 22: p. 39]
One example of long-term hea\w equipment use is that of Detroit Edison's unit
train operations on Conrail's Waynesburg Southern Une of the Monongahela Railway.
Since 1969. steady use of their 125-ton capacity coal hoppers has led Conrail to
determine that rail life was reduced two to seven times what it would have been under
normal 100-ton car operations. Only by installing a premium class of track and
instituting a high level of inspection has the use of this captive equipment become
feasible. [Ref 22: p. 39]
The rail deterioration apparently stems from fatigue rather than wear, in which a
'nominal' increase in wheel load produces a ver\" large reduction in rail life owing to the
highly elastic character of the fatigue factor. Below 28.000-pound axle loads (80-ton
car), rail life is determined by wear life (i.e.. 1100 million gross tons (MGTs) at
2S.000-pounds and not much higher as loads drop). Above 2S.000-pound axle loads
(greater than SO-ton cars), rail life is determined by fatigue (i.e.. rail life drops rapidly
with little increase in axle loads as. for example. 33,000-pound axle load (100-ton car)
fatigues rail after just 300 MGTs). [Ref 22: p. 40]
The quick answer to head oiT such decHne would be to use heat-treated, special
metallurgy rail in the relevant stretches together with the newer profiling techniques of
the rail head that maintain centered wheel loads. These approaches, however, will not
protect track structures against fast deterioration, where in isolated cases, it has been
estimated that bridge life has been reduced from decades to less than 20 years due only
to the effect of higher wheel loadings. [Ref 22: p. 40]
The rail life issue should promise to add a measure of complexity to the evolution
of the next generation of double-stack rail equipment insofar as it will bring the
railroads, interested in preserving their track and not investing heavily in upgrading
their entire network, into conilict with the ocean carriers, hell-bent on squeezing
maximum etliciency out of their contracted overland rail partners.
VI. EXEMPT RAIL TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENTS
The exempt rail transportation agreement is the legal precedent upon which the
economic vitality o[ the new ocean carrier-double-stack-rail intermodal organization is
founded. Without this cooperative agreement, the many traditional encumbrances
previously sacrosant in interstate commerce regulation would have prevented either
mode of carrier from taking advantage of the efficiencies inherent therein.
Proprietary data rights prevent pubUshing the actual carrier's names in the
analysis of the following recently negotiated contract between an ocean carrier and
several railroads. Close inspection of a typical steamship line/railroad contract
provides significant insight into the parameters that mold the scheduling, frequency,
and management of the double-stack service network.
The railroads have agreed to provide round trip rail transportation of loaded or
empty containers ("or empty" i.e., no loading of cargo at the convenience of the rail
carrier without control of the ocean carrier) between major listed cities. Such round
trip shipments shall move in multiplatform railcar trains ("multiplatform railcar"
spcifically demanded, implying expedited handling of containers in express, tightly
coordinated unit trains as associated with that equipment). [Ref 6: p. 1]
The transportation services are provided by the railroads in exchange for a
commitment by the ocean carrier to tender certain minimum numbers of round trip
movements for linehaul via the railroads and pay the taritT schedules hsted in the
contract. Tendering of the minimum volume is considered a material consideration and
inducement, without which the railroads would not agree to give up their marketing
rights to a large volume of container cubes traveling over their rails. [Ref 6: p. I]
In addition to rail linehaul services, the railroads agree to load onto, secure, and
unload from multiplatform railcars the ocean carrier's containers. Any paperwork and
terminal movement of containers will also be handled by the railroads. [Ref 6: pp. 2-3]
The railroad shall furnish the ocean carrier a specified quantity of multiplatform
railcars built for Trailer Train and assigned to that railroad. Mileage and car hire
charges are to be paid by the ocean carrier to the railroad for the railroad's use in
hauling the ocean carrier's containers. However, should the ocean carrier's volumes of
traffic tendered fall below contract minimum or should the ocean carrier terminate the
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contract prior to the agreed upon termination date, the ocean carrier shall be liable for
all car hire charges up to the previously agreed upon contract termination date, with
credit applied toward the account for any alternative use the railroads or Trailer Train
can find for the cars (this means that the ocean carrier is liable for the rental of the
railcar equipment at onset of the contract through termination regardless of outcome,
freeing the railroads from any financial risk whatsoever in this venture). [Ref. 6: pp.
3-4]
Additionally, the ocean carrier must tender the railroad cars to the railroads for a
minimum of 45 round trips per twelve month period or be subject to a "shortage"
charge for not allowing the railroads to meet the minimum transportation requirement.
[Ref. 6: p. 4]
In exchange for the rail transportation furnished by the railroads under the
agreement, the ocean carrier shall pay a rate per round trip per multiplatform railcar
based on 100 percent loaded containers eastbound and percent loaded containers
westbound with small additive charges assessed for westbound loaded containers.
These rates are then escalated based upon price indexes for fuel and non-fuel, wages,
wage supplements, materials and supplies, and other operating expenses. [Refi 6: pp.
5-7,12]
Under deregulation, the terms of the agreements and the rates are considered
confidential between negotiating parties. The same ocean carrier can, therefore,
earnestly negotiate with each regional rail carrier for the most favorable provisions and
rates. This leads to one carrier paying difierent rates and working within differing sets
of restrictions with each participating rail carrier.
It appears, then, that the railroads have essentially traded their control of
marketing the cube of available empty containers directly to retail customers in
exchange for a no-risk multiplatform railcar hauling contract for transporting their (i.e..
ocean carriers') containers. Given that a particular railroad's organization has a finite
capacity for engaging in business activity, the decision to concentrate on fixed fee
contracts with ocean carriers has signaled a migration in strategy from a competitive,
high-risk, value-of-goods pricing scheme in the retail marketing of transportation
services to a relatively low-risk environment involving wholesale marketing of
transportation services at a fi.xed return. The railroads involving themselves heavily in
steamship line contracts, therefore, have given up the opportunity' for large profits
(which the railroads haven't seen since carpetbagger days an>"way) in exchange for
guaranteed volume and a reasonable profit.
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1 he ocean carrier has gained a measure of control and influence over the rail
carrier that enables the steamship Une to influence the manner in which the rail carriers
handle their containers in their yards and how they prioritize their train schedules to
meet vessel sailings. In this way, for a certain fixed profit, the railroads become an
arm. albeit loosely afliliated. of the ocean carrier.
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VII. [MILITARY SERVICE CONSIDERATIONS
A. MILITARY CARGO RATE CONSIDERATIONS
In conjunction with researching the development and make-up of double-stack
container train service, an opinion survey of personnel at the Military Traffic
Management Command-Western Area's (MTVIC-WA) Military Export Cargo Offering
Booking Office, the MiUtary Sealift Command- Pacific's (MSC-PAC) Contracting
Office, and American President Line's military cargo sales representative, revealed that
intermodal container rates, as provided for the military shipper in the MSC Container
Agreement & Rate Guide, had not changed significantly as a result of the introduction
of double-stack train service. Military cargo being primarily vverstbound for export to
overseas bases, the container space had been and continues to be priced at or near
marginal costs (floor price that co\ers only variable costs). Furthermore, the
depressing effect upon rates of the ongoing excess of Pacific Basin container service has
had an overshadowing effect on any potential impact that stack train economics may
have had. The result, therefore, is that personnel working with the Container Rate
Guide have noticed no drop in rates due to introduction of double-stack train service.
B. MILITARY SERVICE APPLICATIONS OF STACK TRAIN TECHNOLOGY
Military service applications of double-stack technology are awaiting a rigorous
comparison of the stack car's unique features with the military service's peacetime and
mobilization requirements. Although the primar\' force behind its development was
efficient and economic bulk transport of containers, certain features, such as the car's
shorter length over conventional flatcars that carry two containers end to end, may
allow stack cars to perform military missions. Perhaps during a mobilization scenario,
a certain port's yard space would not have allowed two hundred containers carried
conventionally to be offloaded from two long trains at once. But a single stack train
would concentrate more containers to be offioaded per section of pier apron and help
widen a logistics bottleneck.
Unique features, such as the Gunderson car's Twin-Stack bulkheads, would make
containerized ammunition shipments more pilfer proof, for example. The MiUtan."
Tralfic .Management Command's (MTMC) Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA)
in Newport News, Virginia has been commissioned to study the impact of double-
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stacking railcars on the defense transportation system. The study will also determine
optimal utilization of double-stacking railcars for militar}' applications.
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VIII. TERMINAL EFFICIENCY ISSUES CONCERNING STACK TRAINS
A. INTRODUCTION
The issue of terminal efficiency has been raised by the double-stack train's
increased ability to dump large volumes of containers into a rail or marine yard at one
time. An examination of the issues and developments in rail and marine terminal
design are valuable at this point.
B. RAILROAD YARDS
1. Global I
First, the issues related to development of the intermodal container system will
be discussed. Global I, as mentioned in Chapter IV, is the Chicago & North Western
Railroad's new double-stack-only railroad container trani handling facility located at
the former Wood Street and Robey Street Yards. Named Global I in recognition of
the international cargo movement through the yard, the railroads have been coming to
the realization that, with the current state of atfairs, even the Chicago facility is
nothing more than an extension of an ocean carrier's turning basin for containers.
Steamship lines were consulted to aid in the most eflicient design of the ultramodern
facility. [Ref 10: pp. 32-33]
Inno\ative track configuration is central to the yard's operation. Having three
parallel tracks will simplify the unloading of double-stack trains through a process
called "stop and swap" as illustrated in Figure 8.1. With a double-stack train on the
middle track, and conventional TOFC cars on the two tracks alongside, containers can
be transferred from the double-stack track to the other trains with a minimal amount
o[ handhng. An overhead crane, with an inside clearance of 66 feet, will straddle the
three tracks, as well as one chassis lane on each side. It can transfer containers from
the stack train onto chassis, either for road deUvery or to be placed on one of the
TOFC cars for rail delivery. [Ref 10: p. 33]
Roughly 30 percent of the yards container volume leaves by rail, with the
remainder departing over-the-road. The majority of outbound containers are
distributed to final destination within 300 miles of Chicago. This makes the ease of










Figure 8.1 New Global I Gantn' Crane.
Four sets of tracks equipped with the new gantr\' cranes, model MJIOOODS
built by Mi-Jack, can accommodate 10 five-unit cars each. An additional area can
handle another 22 cars with existing overhead cranes and conventional side loaders.
[Ref. 10: p. 33]
Another feature of the new yard is the fact that containers aren't stacked. All
containers are on chassis and are driven out of or around the yard by tractors. This
highlights the continuous How goal of new terminal design. The majority of containers
are expected to cycle through the yard within hours of arrival, assuring the fast
turnaround necessan.' for a seven day Chicago West Coast round trip schedule. Any
delay in round trip time would have required the acquisition of additional expensive
railcar sets to meet vessel sailing schedules. [Ref 10: p. 33]
Interestingly, efTiciency more than speed has been the result of the Global I
facility. The unload/load time for one stack train remains 12 hours, but at a much
lower cost with the new capital intensive equipment. Also, with the ability to
simultaneously handle three 200 container stack trains in 12 hours, the yard now
boasts an annual throughput capacity of 876,000 containers. The true operational
limitation has been shifted to the speed and capacity constraints of the other segments
of the transportation system, i.e., the port loading facilities at one end and the
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customer's ability to handle his freight and get it out the door at the other end. The
stack train has had the eOect of enlarging the conduit diameter in the journey leg by
enabling a larger slug of containers to be delivered more quickly than before and puts
greater emphasis upon terminal handling facilities. As terminals are upgraded, the
network constraints will continually shift to whichever is the most antiquated and
inefficient facility. [Ref 10: pp. 33-34]
This quickened container transfer pace has required more intensive
management control of operations and tighter coordination between carriers. Weekly,
the C&NW management at Global I meets with vessel operators to map out a game
plan. Computer links with western ports allow C&NW to know the exact makeup of
trains two days before they arrive and any modifications to port calls based on storms
at sea or other constraints. [Ref 10: p. 34]
Electronic advance-receipt of paperwork and processing the driver's outbound
paperwork at check-in time all help to remove stop points in the container's travel
through the yard. [Ref 10: p. 34]
Preloading is done whenever a shipper buys spare sets of cars and leaves them
at the yard. Some pre-load as much as one-half to three-quarters of a train consist.
This dramatically cuts turnaround time. All these techniques have been developed to
reduce the chance of vessel delays in port. In essence, the influence of the ocean
carrier has now been felt by railroads as far inland as Chicago insofar as the
justification for the S36 miUion expenditure for these improvements stems from the
high cost of vessel delay incurred by the steamship operator, not the railroad. The
insulation between the two modes of transportation has finally been broken, wherein
the potential penalty costs of vessel delay are traded for a smaller additional charge for
more intensive, expedited railroad equipment operation. [Ref 10: p. 34]
Just hke a false floor beneath a computer installation, the C&NW yard is
asphalt paved, not cemented, to allow for inexpensive remodelling as improvements are
already envisioned. Fully computerized loading gantries that are guided by imbedded
wire, and computerized sorting, watching, and positioning of trailers are just two of
many hands olT container handling innovations foreseen in the future. [Ref 10: p. 34]
2. Hub And Spoke Route System
Another disappearing entity is the "circus ramp" style terminal for TOFC and
container-on-chassis-on-flatcar unloading. Named for the method used by circus trains
to unload their cars, a ramp would be constructed at a spur and car crossover plates
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would allow tractors to drive oIT trailers over connected flatcars to one exit ramp. The
requirement for speedy deliveiT. as exemplified by tight stack train schedules, has
doomed the circus ramp terminals to obsolescence. The many stops required bv an
intermodal train to service the multitude of circus ramps tremendously slows deliver}- of
the final destination trailers. What has replaced circus ramps is the new "hub and
spoke" system whereby express trains deliver to a few major hub terminals from which
final deliver}' by truck is arranged. Although the truck leg maybe slightly longer, the
rail leg has been dramatically shortened in time. This concept further clears the way
for stack trains to service a greater number of routes in the developing domestic
containerized freight network. [Ref 23: p. 58]
C. MARINE TERMINALS
1. Introduction
In addition to the inland railyard having to become more efficient to
accommodate stack trains, so too must marine terminals handling the new 4500-TEU
ships. In effect, the marine terminal must quickly and efTiciently convert a 4500-TEU
mega-ship load of containers into a string of outbound 200 container (400-TEU) mini-
ship loads onboard stack trains.
Most significant in this trend has been the activity along the Pacific Coast
wherein railroads and port authorities are cooperating in establishing large railyards at
or near the port areas. The impetus appears to be the crucial solicitation of domestic
cargo via price, service, or a combination for the westbound trip in order to make the
concept overwhelmingly attractive to shippers as well as carriers. The meshing of
import and domestic traffic in the form of containers at these facilities is causing many
handling problems for the yards that possess neither the storage areas required nor the
room to expand. This has already developed pressures toward fewer but larger
terminals and more efTicient handling equipment at Seattle, Tacoma, Oakland, and
most recently Los Angeles. [Ref 24: p. 39]
2. Intermodal Container Transfer Facility
The most notable example of these new facilities is the Intermodal Container
Transfer Facility (ICTF). a S62 miUion joint project of Southern Pacific and the ports
of Los Angeles and Long Beach. When completed, the 150-acre facility is expected to
handle 360,000 containers annually. It has five operating tracks, center-aisle parking
and two run-around tracks, a combination that will permit the prestaging of loads for
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an 84-car double-stack train. The complex will include 10 buildings, a six-stor\- control
lower and a I6-lane inspection building with Customs accommodations. The entire
terminal will be radio-and TV-monitored for 24 hours, seven days a week, operation. A
view of the ICTF is shown in Figure 8.2. [Ref. 24: p. 40]
Such "load centers" are ideal in that they: [Ref. 24: p. 40]
1) Serve a large metropolitan population market.
2) Have a well-located harbor with good port facilities.
3) Feature a suitable inland infrastructure for trucks and railroads.
4) Can call on nearby support from freight forwarders, brokers, and banks.
Figure 8.2 The Intermodal Container Transfer Facility.
Dockside water depths will allow access by future 5500-TEL' vessels. Ship
loading gantn.' cranes will be able to reach over 16 rows of containers stacked four high
on a ships deck, with 12 rows stacked nine high in the hold. That means an outreach
to 14()-fect or more in which multiple boxes are transferred at high throughput rates.
These "fourth generation" cranes will be rated at 40 long tons in capacity. [Ref 24: p.
40]
Such productivity rates extend to a capability for loading and unloading 800
to 1000 40- to 45-foot containers every 24 hours. By comparison, inland terminals
such as the old C&NW vard in Chicaco are rated hishlv elFicient in handlins 600 boxes
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per day (the new Global I rate translates theoretically to 12(XJ containers per 24 hour
period). [Refs. 24.10; pp. 40.36]
3. On-Dock. Transfer
The new facilities can be expected to eventually incorporate direct vessel-to-
rail movements, overcoming, in the process, "place of rest" concerns. The number of
movements, or steps, a container must go through from lift out of the vessel container
slot to the final load onto an over-the-road truck chassis or rail is the most important
determinant in measuring terminal efiiciency. Both containerships and double-stack
trains are highly specialized systems for container transportation. Getting the most
efficiency out of both systems from a single terminal is a difficult process. [Ref 24: p.
40]
Current terminal buffer operations typically require at least two lifts and a
drayage. One lift ofT the vessel to a yard chassis, then a temporary storage followed by
a dray out of the gate to a rail terminal for lift onto an intermodal railcar are the
minimum steps currently taken. Some port facilities have additional storage or a long
dray as additional inconveniences. No North American port has maintained a direct
ship-to-rail transfer of significant volume or duration. A properly sorted rail train
consist cannot be practically loaded under a vessel container lift crane without
significant jockeying of an unwieldly train set. The on-dock transfer systems use either
a vehicle or ground storage as an intermediary between the ship and the railroad cars.
[Ref 25: pp. 1-2]
The objective of on-dock transfer is to reduce the cost, time, and
administrative effort required to shift containers between the ship and the railroad.
The major cost elements in container transfer are terminal space and facilities,
container lifting and moving equipment, the number of container lifts, and the number
of drayage hookups and drops. The time taken for each operation affects both cost
and service quality. The theoretical advantages of on-dock transfer lie in the complete
elimination of one or more operations from the chain of lifts and moves required
between ship and rail. However, the advent of dedicated double-stack trains has
encouraged railroads to expand off-dock ICTFs to avoid separating the mile-long
trains. The railroads want to minimize switching and sorting, and so might be
amenable to handling a full train on-dock, if it would fit. Perhaps blocks of six to ten
double-stack cars dedicated to specific customers may allow railroads to serve less-
than-trainload, single user terminals while keeping switching and sorting costs to a
minimum. [Ref 25: pp. 2.10]
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Because of various limitations, the physical dray between ship and rail cannot
be readily eliminated. What can be eliminated by co-locating rail facilities, for
example, are the gate barriers, the use of highway licensed and equipped drayage
equipment, and the loading restrictions imposed by highway weight limits. Double-
stack trains, or sets of dedicated double-stack cars, can be elTiciently handled at on-
dock transfers where sulTicient volume is available to outweigh the rail switching costs
and minimize any re-sorting or topping-ofT requirements. [Ref 25: pp. 14.17]
D. CONCLUSION
It has been shown that vast sums of money and significant design elTorts are
being expended in the development of rail and marine terminal efiiciency. When
complete and fine-tuned to accept the volumes of containers that mega-ships and
double-stack trains can surge through their facilities, a network will emerge that will
consist of just a handful ot^ super-high volume, super-efiicient. container handling
facilities through which the vast majority of U.S. import export and transcontinental
domestic container cargo will move. Double-stack development has helped point out
the absolute necessity for investment in these facilities, the lack of which would
generate massive inefilciencies to counter the potential of stack trains.
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IX. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
It has been conclusively presented, with rigorous background data, that
emergence of the double-stack container train resulted from three major influences.
The first, enabling legislation through deregulation of the railroads and the ocean
carriers, has legally allowed binding contractual arrangements between the rail carriers
and steamship lines. The second influence entailed a focus on cost saving techniques
and equipment such as double-stack Linertrains that intense market competition forced
upon the ocean carriers and the rail carriers reluctantly acquiesced to. Stack trains are
a cost saving device rather than a revenue enhancement innovation in that the stack
train performs an identical service to conventional COFC equipment, but at a
significant savings in fuel and labor resources. The third influence came as a result of
the keen competition in worldwide intermodal container carriage. U.S. landbridge
advocates chose the double-stack container train to use as a weapon in challenging the
all-water carriers for the increasingly lucrative eastbound import traffic originating in
the Far East and destined either for the U.S. market or landbridged to the growing
European markets.
Following a brief historical recounting of the first stack train service and a
description of the current service network, a thorough analysis of the stack train
manufacturers and their equipment oflerings helped to conceptualize what a double-
stack train looks like and what benefits it provides for the operator in saving precious
resources in fuel and manpower. Further, an exacting description of competing designs
helped to focus on their differences and similarities in the hopes that such rigorous
analysis might spawn creative adaptation of the equipment for some unique military
service appUcation.
A rare view of an actual ocean carrier/railroad contract followed, providing
insight into the actual clauses that shape how the railroad receives a certain revenue in
exchange for equipment leasing and minimum volume requirements for container
oflerings by the steamship lines to the railroads. Depending on the actual profitability
to the railroads of the fixed fee service provided, a clear-cut winner may prove hard to
select.
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A general view holds that double-stack, container trains have been somewhat
more profitable to the railroads than conventional COFC has been. Caution is urged,
though, in that financial operating data on stack trains is not generally available from
railroad carriers sincerely interested in protecting proprietarty data and expanding their
share of the market with just the right fine-tuned contractual arrangements to be
competitive.
The development of the new intermodal container freight network has led to
more quickly exposing the inefficient links in the fast evolving time-sensitive logistics
network. Larger container ships and more tightly scheduled 200-container stack trains
impose mounting pressure on both rail and marine container handling yards to move
these large volume container surges through their systems efliciently and quickly,
without mishap. Just-in-time inventorv' management techniques and the increasingly
high-value nature of the goods shipped in containers make it paramount that terminals
cease being short-term warehouse facilities for containers and become just a bufTer
zone for interchange of containers between modes. Global I and the Intermodal
Container Transfer Facility total up as a S9S million investment in the newest
techniques for terminal handling of containers and double-stack container trains.
B. CONCLUSION
A whole new worldwide intermodal container freight transportation system is fast
developing that promises to radically replace traditional views of handling and moving
cargo. The parochial viewpoints of each mode (water, rail, truck) in which a defiant
attitude prevented cooperative efforts have of necessity been replaced by a strong
desire to posture themselves to fit into their niche in the intermodal transportation
network.
Double-stack container trains have undoubtedly become the major links between
vastly improved marine and rail mega-terminals. A philosophical aura, of sorts, has
evolved around stack train operations that imbue a spirit of prompt, tightly controlled
and monitored, highly expedited service that appears to go far beyond the mere
mechanical differences between stack train well cars and conventional COFC
equipment. It seems as though first the steamship lines, and then the railroad
operators, have taken the opportunity to use the stack train innovation as a convenient
symbol to attach onto the new ways of thinking about cargo handling and movement
control. With the stack trains already inherent physical attributes of fuel and
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manpower savings, its success and greater market penetration througli improved service
is ensured as well.
The fallout, then, of the double-stack development, far exceeds merely improved
eniciency of traditional operations. The ocean carriers and railroads have pushed
forward to actually enhance service through new management techniques and cargo
control and, as a result of widespread publicity for the stack train, have linked its
appearance with dramatic transportation system improvements.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
As the equipment manufacturers are flush with success and enthusiastic about
further technological improvements to their new cars, the military services would be
wise to take advantage of this state of affairs and thoroughly examine their cargo and
unique equipment transport requirements for possible special adaptation of these cars.
The Gunderson bulkhead cars could be tested for safe and more secure ammunition
movements as just one example. Perhaps a future 125-ton truck-equipped stand-alone
stack car could provide compact transport of heavy military cargo in a mobilization
scenario to port facilities with limited railroad siding accommodations.
As for the commercial movement of military cargo, the awareness to the presence
of double-stack train routes might open a new avenue of negotiation for volume point-
to-point rates in which the knowledge of lower carrier costs through stack car service
along a particular route may enable the government negotiator to hold out for lower
margin rates. At least it would provide service improvements in the form of reduced
transit times and reduced loss and damage claims as a result of faster, more tightly
monitored train movements.
A greater awareness of the benefits available from double-stack train service and
its equipment is highly recommended for all niilitary personnel involved in or dealing
with the transportation industry. Military cargo shippers must also understand the
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